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Social Solidarity 
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Matthew B. Lawrence,  
Elizabeth Y. McCuskey,  
and Lindsay F. Wiley
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) reflected a sig-nificant philosophical shift in the United States from distributing costs associated with 
sickness based on the principle of actuarial fairness 
toward a social solidarity principle premised on the 
“goals of mutual aid and support.”1 Yet four fixtures 
of American health care law complicate the transla-
tion of the solidarity ethic into real-world outcomes: 
(1) federalism, (2) fiscal pluralism, (3) reliance on pri-
vate ordering and private markets for health coverage, 
and (4) an emphasis on individual rights and personal 
responsibility. The ACA’s approach to operationalizing 
solidarity insufficiently accounted for these fixtures. 
This ultimately limited its success and continues to 
threaten its durability, in ways laid bare by the 2020 
coronavirus pandemic. 
After tracing the philosophical evolution of health 
care law in the United States toward the ethic of social 
solidarity, this article identifies four legal fixtures of 
the American health care system in tension with it. 
Assessing the degrees to which the ACA, Medicare-
for-All, and public-option proposals confront these 
fixtures reveals trade-offs in policy design with which 
reformers hoping to enhance solidarity must grapple. 
Health reform must navigate through the fixtures 
to effectuate an American version of social solidar-
ity in health care. Successfully charting this course 
may demand that reformers set their sights beyond 
the modest aim of universal coverage and embrace a 
broader health justice goal.2 Social solidarity in health 
care requires more than just getting everyone covered 
in fragmented health insurance pools — it requires a 
commitment to mutual support and a sense that the 
benefits and burdens of illness and our system for 
treating and preventing it should be shared by all in 
a way that is fair and just. Though the four fixtures 
make the path toward social solidarity in health care 
more challenging in the U.S., taking seriously the need 
to accommodate, leverage, or overcome the fixtures 
can help to build a mutually-funded health care sys-
tem that is both durable and distinctively American. 
This article’s exposition of the fixtures of American 
health care law and the trade-offs they force in pursuit 
of social solidarity offers a framework for discussion 
among lawmakers, policy advisers, scholars, research-
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ers, and voters as they take the next steps in health 
reform.
I. Social Solidarity in American Health Care 
Law
Social solidarity manifests as a driving ethic, a means 
of pursuing that ethic, and as an outcome.3 This 
article focuses on achievement of social solidarity in 
the outcomes of health reform. The ACA represented 
an important change in U.S. health reform policy 
because it internalized and normalized a social soli-
darity ethic. Yet the ACA’s pursuit of a modest and 
compromised “universal coverage” goal and its con-
cessions to competing interests in that pursuit limited 
the achievement of social solidarity in health care. 
Recently, the 2020 coronavirus pandemic has under-
scored these limitations in the ACA’s approach to and 
achievement of social solidarity outcomes, while giv-
ing social solidarity added prominence in the national 
conversation.4
A. The Evolution toward a Social Solidarity Ethic in 
American Health Care Law
Other countries have developed collective financ-
ing and administration schemes built on a principle 
of mutual aid.5 In the U.S., however, a decentralized, 
free-market approach highly deferential to individual 
choice and personal responsibility has prevailed.6 In 
the early twentieth century, health care providers orga-
nized themselves into prepaid insurance plans and 
employers began to offer health coverage as a benefit 
to workers.7 In 1965, the federal government created 
Medicare and Medicaid to cover three overlapping 
groups who were left out of our market-driven private 
insurance system: people of retirement age, people 
with qualifying disabilities, and children and some 
adults living in low-income households who were 
deemed deserving of public support.8 Government 
administrators took a relatively hands-off approach 
to prices and utilization, eschewing the negotiating 
power that publicly-administered programs elsewhere 
in the world exert to check rent-seeking by providers, 
and thereby allowing private insurers to reap substan-
tial profits.9
As Deborah Stone has argued, the private health 
insurance on which most Americans rely fosters in 
people “a sense of their difference, rather than their 
commonalities, and their responsibility for themselves 
only, rather than their interdependence,”10 leading to 
the fragmentation of “communities into ever-smaller, 
more homogeneous groups.”11 Although private health 
insurance is subsidized through laws that exempt 
health care benefits from payroll and income taxes,12 
the relatively well-off households who disproportion-
ately benefit from these indirect subsidies are pro-
tected from the stigma that attaches to dependence on 
public benefits.13 Moreover, reliance on private mar-
kets to dictate the distribution of health care goods 
and services has allowed Americans to avoid difficult 
public deliberations over which people and which 
conditions should trigger collective responsibility for 
health and well-being.14 
In some ways, the ACA was a fairly modest extension 
of what came before. Its primary goal was to achieve 
“universal coverage” — a source of third-party fund-
ing for health care costs — rather than fully securing 
universal access to care. The ACA’s core compromise 
on coverage preserved the existing fragmentary mix 
of public and private sources, rather than replacing it 
with a truly universal and unified system.15 It excluded 
undocumented immigrants and (after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius16) many people 
living in states that have rejected federal financing to 
expand Medicaid eligibility remain uninsured. The 
ACA subsidized private insurance rather than dis-
mantling it.
In other ways, the ACA was a watershed moment 
that reflected and reinforced a general trend away 
from actuarial fairness in American health care. It 
expanded Medicaid eligibility beyond the groups who 
have traditionally been understood as the “deserving 
poor” (children, pregnant women, and people with 
disabilities). It offered direct subsidies to make private 
insurance more affordable for additional low- and 
middle-income households. It fundamentally altered 
the free-market business model of health insurance — 
in which each paid according to her likely needs — by 
sharply limiting underwriting-based factors related to 
health status in the individual and small group mar-
kets. These developments simultaneously signal the 
emergence of a new approach emphasizing a social 
solidarity ethic and pave the way for its fuller realiza-
tion in social solidarity outcomes.17
B. Reforms’ Goals and Objectives
This philosophical evolution brings us to the current 
moment in health reform: one decade into the Afford-
able Care Act’s implementation, experience with the 
limitations of the ACA’s approach has focused national 
debate on how to transcend those limits. Most Ameri-
cans wish to preserve the ACA’s progress.18 The pop-
ulace also recognizes a need for further reform, but 
diverges on the best approach and the role that gov-
ernment should play.19 
A slight majority of Americans now for the first 
time support the basic idea of a single national health 
plan, though that majority also belies a deep divide 
along partisan lines and varies with the terminology 
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used to describe a national plan.20 Public support for 
expanded national health care finance has prompted 
progressive lawmakers to introduce proposals for 
implementing single-payer systems at the national 
and state levels.21 Every Democratic candidate in the 
2020 presidential race supported expanding public 
finance of health care either through a single-payer 
model (e.g., Medicare for All) or expanding access to 
existing public programs by creating a buy-in option 
(e.g., Medicaid or Medicare public option).22 
The stated goals of these single-payer and public-
option proposals reflect some consensus among sup-
porters about what needs fixing in the current system, 
and how they believe expanding access to publicly 
financed health care will help. Health reform momen-
tum from the political left currently coalesces around 
three intertwining objectives: Improving population 
health, achieving universal and equitable access to 
care, and controlling health care costs — both for the 
country and for households. 
Proponents of federal Medicare and Medicaid 
expansions point to evidence that America spends 
more on health care than its economic peer nations, 
but does not deliver better health outcomes at the 
population level.23 The version of Medicare for All 
introduced in the U.S. House in January 2019 would 
require annual data collection and reporting on pop-
ulation health outcomes and disparities, state-by-
state.24 State-level reforms also target better health 
outcomes at the population level.25
Focusing on improvement in population health 
outcomes and identifying the social determinants that 
influence those outcomes points to the related objec-
tive of establishing meaningful, equitable access to 
good health care. Universal coverage for all Americans 
is a top priority for supporters of a national health 
plan,26 and was a goal of the ACA.27 The stated objec-
tives of single-payer and public-option reforms push 
beyond universal coverage toward solidarity, often 
expressed in terms of a universal right to health care,28 
not merely universal access to health insurance.
Proponents of expanded national health care high-
light cost-control as a primary goal of reform. Control-
ling health care “costs” requires effort on two fronts: 
national and household.29 On a broad scale, health 
reforms aim to reduce the drain of health care spend-
ing on the national economy by lowering the net costs 
of health care from all sources, especially spending 
through government programs. Relatedly, proposals 
seek to reduce the financial drain of health care on 
individuals and households by lowering out-of-pocket 
spending on premiums, deductibles, copays, coin-
surance, and uninsured care. The ACA’s multi-payer 
reforms slowed the growth in health care spending 
for the first time in decades, but its very limited prog-
ress controlling costs for individuals and households 
has opened the door to wider support for single-payer 
reforms.30 
Even before the ACA, the American public was con-
cerned with similar objectives for reforming the health 
care system: expanding coverage, decreasing individ-
ual and governmental costs, while maintaining qual-
ity and choice in care.31 The new post-ACA majority, 
which favors some version of a national health plan, 
reflects a long evolution toward the ethic of social soli-
darity in health care.32 At the same time, frustration 
with the U.S. health care system — from surprise med-
ical bills to health policy instability to pandemic pre-
paredness — makes for a zeitgeist in which Americans 
generally agree on ends but struggle to find consensus 
on means.
Even before the ACA, the American public was concerned with similar 
objectives for reforming the health care system: expanding coverage, 
decreasing individual and governmental costs, while maintaining quality 
and choice in care. The new post-ACA majority, which favors some version 
of a national health plan, reflects a long evolution toward the ethic of social 
solidarity in health care. At the same time, frustration with the U.S. health 
care system — from surprise medical bills to health policy instability to 
pandemic preparedness — makes for a zeitgeist in which Americans generally 
agree on ends but struggle to find consensus on means.
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II. Social Solidarity’s Mismatch with Fixtures 
of American Health Care Law
Although the ACA advanced an ethic of social solidar-
ity in health care, realization was frustrated by four 
legal fixtures of the U.S. health care system that stand 
in tension with social solidarity: (1) our federal system 
of dual sovereignty between the national and state 
governments, (2) the subdivision of responsibility for 
health care costs among a multiplicity of payers; (3) 
our historical reliance on private ordering and pri-
vate markets for health coverage; and (4) an abiding 
emphasis on individual liberties and personal respon-
sibility. We refer to these existing features as “fixtures” 
because structural and political entrenchment, as well 
as longstanding normative commitments, make them 
difficult to displace. These four fixtures of federalism, 
fiscal pluralism, privatization, and individualism tend 
to work against social solidarity in health care in dis-
tinctive ways, which next-step health reforms must 
confront.
A. Federalism
Health care regulation in America must account for 
both state and federal policymakers and their fluid, 
regionally-sensitive political relationships. In particu-
lar, the sovereign powers of states within the Ameri-
can federal system — and the prevailing narratives 
of deference to them — have shaped the trajectory of 
health care regulation in ways that divide (and thereby 
undermine social solidarity) on a national scale and 
diverge from other countries’ experiences. This “fed-
eralism” fixture we have identified refers to both the 
American system of dual sovereignty between the 
national and state governments established by the 
Constitution,33 and the political and jurisprudential 
narratives of comity and deference to state authority 
that drive federal policies and their implementation.34 
The duality and malleability of American federal-
ism arms opponents of solidarity in health care with 
legal weapons to challenge both the establishment 
of nationwide reforms in the name of deference to 
states, and to challenge the establishment of individ-
ual state reforms in the name of preemptive national 
uniformity. 
Solidarity and federalism can coexist, as they do in 
other countries, and the U.S. Constitution’s federal-
ism structure is not unavoidably antithetical to social 
solidarity.35 The Constitution’s enumeration of federal 
legislative power ostensibly limits the federal regula-
tory spheres,36 while the Tenth Amendment reserves 
the mass of un-enumerated regulatory powers to state 
governments.37 When Congress makes federal law 
within its enumerated spheres, the Supremacy Clause 
subordinates conflicting state laws through preemp-
tion.38 Modern constitutional jurisprudence comfort-
ably extends federal legislative power to cover the 
establishment of a universal, nationwide health plan 
and the levy of various taxes to fund it.39 On that same 
constitutional foundation, federal law has built the 
dominant share of the existing health care regulatory 
infrastructure since World War II, through Medicare, 
Medicaid, ERISA, HIPAA, and the Affordable Care 
Act.40 
American federalism’s delicate political accounting 
for state autonomy has obstructed the path toward a 
full embrace of social solidarity. Federal reforms do not 
necessarily need to cede power to state preferences or 
rely on state implementation, but Congress frequently 
does so voluntarily to achieve limited political con-
sensus.41 Even with such concessions, resistant states 
or other opponents of federal policies have not been 
shy about challenging the boundaries of federalism 
through litigation. Courts’ inconsistent reliance on a 
narrative of comity and deference to states has further 
complicated efforts to establish national protections.42 
Deference to states’ autonomy, even within a fed-
erally-funded regulatory infrastructure, can entrench 
existing disparities between states and the popula-
tions that inhabit them. The Medicaid program, for 
example, employs a cooperative federalism design in 
which states choose whether to implement the pro-
gram and may negotiate states of some of the terms 
on which they will receive funding. Statutory waivers 
enabled some states to pursue more expansive solidar-
ity models and extend coverage to all low-income resi-
dents. The federalism narrative of state autonomy ver-
sus federal coercion in NFIB v. Sebelius, by contrast, 
enabled states governed by those hostile to solidarity 
to reject the ACA’s federal Medicaid expansion and 
emboldened them to negotiate waivers that under-
mine social solidarity goals, such as imposing work 
requirements.43
Other key features of the ACA intentionally deferred 
to state authority in the process of national reform,44 
diluting the statute’s universal coverage strategy. Reli-
ance on state implementation of the exchanges and 
the provision of a waiver for states to deviate from cer-
tain national protections in the name of “State Inno-
vation” serve as two prominent examples,45 while the 
resort to state definitions for federal essential health 
benefits represents another.46 Political bargains struck 
in the spirit of voluntary deference to the states have 
spurred opportunistic variations in policy and exacer-
bated some interstate disparities,47 offsetting gains in 
health equity produced by more durable federal base-
lines.48 For example, in 2018 HHS issued guidance 
stating that it would base state waiver decisions on a 
measure of whether the state plan would preserve a 
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level of “access to” coverage, rather than actual enroll-
ment in coverage.49 Those solidarity-diluting con-
cessions do not insulate federal statutes from direct 
attacks through state litigation, either, as illustrated 
by state attorney general litigation against the ACA.50 
These developments illuminate the federalism fix-
ture’s pliability. Federalism can be wielded in ways 
that reinforce state autonomy or deny it.51 Similarly, 
state power does not act intrinsically for or against 
social solidarity, but depends on the preferences of 
those wielding it. State autonomy may frustrate fed-
eral law’s efforts to establish nationwide protections. 
But the preemptive power of federal law can hinder 
state experimentation with solidarity-enhancing poli-
cies. For example, the federal Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts states 
from enforcing regulations that impermissibly “relate 
to” the employer-sponsored health benefits, a major 
deterrent to states wishing to pursue their own soli-
darity-enhancing reforms.52
B. Fiscal Pluralism
Fiscal pluralism is another distinctive fixture of Amer-
ican law that influences the attainability and shape of 
social solidarity when it comes to Americans’ health. 
By “fiscal pluralism,” we mean a tendency to divide 
costs associated with Americans’ sickness and health 
into separate, fiscally disintegrated categories. Some-
times referred to as “fragmentation,” we refer to this 
phenomenon as “pluralism” to highlight the underly-
ing tendency toward division, which produces frag-
mentation. Fiscal pluralism impedes the realization 
of solidarity by giving decisionmakers — providers, 
patients, caretakers, and policymakers — economic 
incentives to ignore the impact of their choices on 
benefits and burdens in fiscal categories for which 
they are not responsible. (In economic terms, it cre-
ates positive and negative externalities.)
Consider the division of responsibility for health 
care costs incurred by individuals who become sick. 
States pay a share of health care costs incurred by 
Medicaid enrollees and lose income tax revenues not 
paid by sick residents or caretakers who forego paid 
work in favor of care work.53 The federal government 
pays a large share of health care costs for Medicare 
enrollees54 and pays a significant share of health care 
costs for Medicaid beneficiaries, TRICARE ben-
eficiaries, ACA enrollees, and employees enrolled in 
group health plans (which are subsidized in part by 
federal tax expenditures).55 Private companies pay a 
large share of health costs for employees and their 
dependents via health benefits. Though employers 
pass much of this cost on to employees in the form of 
reduced wages, the employees subsidize each other’s 
costs. Patients pay a significant share of their health 
care costs through cost sharing, in addition to second-
ary costs of illness including lost wages and reduced 
resources for housing, transportation, or nutrition.56 
Finally, loved ones of patients pay a significant share 
of health care costs through unreimbursed care work, 
as well as contributions toward financing uncovered 
or unaffordable treatments.57
Consider also the different division of responsibility 
for upstream health investments which might reduce 
the costs of cure and sickness among numerous actors 
and categories. Although governments (state and 
federal) may fully fund health care investments, they 
choose piecemeal which investments to pursue. Gov-
ernment costs are often further fragmented at the 
level of individual actors or programs. Federal budget-
ing rules, for example, treat “mandatory” expenditures 
on programs like Medicare and Medicaid as distinct 
from “discretionary” expenditures on programs like 
the SUPPORT Act’s funding for substance use dis-
order treatment and recovery.58 These rules require 
that increases in mandatory spending be offset by 
decreases in mandatory spending, and that increases 
in discretionary spending similarly be offset by dis-
cretionary decreases.59 Similarly, state spending is 
often separated by department and program; Eliza-
beth Weeks’ recent work has shown the many different 
dimensions on which states and localities have been 
impacted financially by the opioid crisis.60 Moreover, 
individuals, families, employers, and charitable orga-
nizations pursue a variety of health investments.61 
This fiscal pluralism encompasses byproducts of 
other fixtures of American law. Federalism divides 
between federal and state; privatization divides 
between government and the market; emphasis 
on individual rights and responsibilities facilitates 
the continuing invisibility of care work relative to 
other more visible components of patient care.62 Fis-
cal pluralism nonetheless takes a form distinct from 
the other fixtures and captures a descriptive account 
of the health care finance system that opponents of 
single-payer reforms raise as normative support for 
the status quo. Pluralism can be desirable in certain 
contexts: in a market where unification means com-
petition-stifling monopoly; to particularly vulnerable 
populations, who may benefit from distinctive treat-
ment and a separate “risk pool” in order to receive care 
tailored to them and promote equity; to classical liber-
als who favor the idea of an autonomous, independent 
individual as a societal building block; and to experi-
mentalists who see in pluralism the potential for con-
tinual learning and improvement through diversity.63 
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C. Privatization
Preference for private markets over government inter-
vention is the foundation of the US economy, a fixture 
of American law, and an obstacle in the path of social 
solidarity in American health care. Collective choice of 
the goods and services essential for human well-being, 
and collective financing to secure such goods and ser-
vices, is typically viewed as an exception requiring jus-
tification, rather than the norm. 
Most Americans are covered by private health 
insurance,64 and most of them pay for coverage jointly 
with an employer as a fringe benefit. The longstand-
ing favorable tax treatment of these benefits subsi-
dizes private insurance.65 ERISA also encourages large 
private employers to offer health benefits by shield-
ing them from state regulation.66 The ACA doubled 
down on private health insurance as the predominant 
model. Rather than further extending public pro-
grams, the ACA established new tax credits for the 
purchase of private coverage on the exchanges.67 In 
addition, the ACA’s employer mandate68 and restric-
tion of premium-assistance tax credits to households 
that lack access to affordable employer-based cover-
age strengthened the link between health insurance 
and employment. 
Private health insurance companies play an impor-
tant role in public programs, too. From its inception in 
1965, Medicare has relied on private insurers to issue 
coverage determinations governing which goods and 
services are covered for which patients and to process 
claims for reimbursement.69 The Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997 took privatization of Medicare further by 
giving beneficiaries the option of enrolling in one of 
many government-contracted private health plans.70 
When Medicare benefits were expanded to include 
prescription drugs in the Medicare Modernization Act 
of 2003, Congress dictated that these benefits could 
only be provided through fully privatized plans.71 Cur-
rently, about one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are 
enrolled in private Medicare Advantage plans. And for 
the two-thirds of beneficiaries enrolled in traditional 
Medicare, day-to-day coverage decisions are made by 
private insurance companies.
Private health insurance companies play an even 
bigger role in Medicaid, with about 70% of all Med-
icaid enrollees covered by Medicaid Managed Care 
plans,72 the vast majority of which are run by private 
insurance companies.73 States first began to experi-
ment with privatization via administrative waivers 
under Section 1115.74 The Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 gave states the option of offering alternative 
Medicaid benefit packages — all of which are sub-
ject to far more flexible federal oversight and most 
of which are privately administered — for specified 
groups of Medicaid beneficiaries without any need for 
a waiver.75 When the ACA expanded Medicaid eligibil-
ity, it specified that the expansion population must be 
covered through alternative benefit plans.76 
Our fragmentary system of private and public 
administration has allowed lucrative and highly seg-
mented private markets for health care goods, ser-
vices, and coverage to thrive. By relying on private 
companies to make coverage determinations — even 
in public assistance programs — lawmakers have 
eschewed opportunities for deliberative, democratic, 
collective problem-solving on the essential question 
of which individuals will be allowed affordable access 
to which treatments for which conditions. Although 
underwriting reforms that restrict individualized 
rate-setting and eligibility determinations by private 
insurance companies have shifted us closer to collec-
tive financing based on a principle of mutual aid, the 
multitude of privately administered risk pools and 
reimbursement arrangements stymies the realization 
of true solidarity in American health care.
D. Individual Rights and Responsibilities
The emphasis on individual rights and its converse, 
personal responsibility, are another foundational 
aspect of American law. Both forms of individualism 
challenge the realization of social solidarity in health 
care; assertions of individual liberty have been used to 
limit the government’s ability to effectuate universal 
health reforms, and notions of personal responsibil-
ity have enshrined individual cost-sharing as a central 
feature of health care consumption despite limiting 
access and affordability. 
Without a positive right to health care under the 
U.S. Constitution, individual rights are expressed as 
the negative right to be free from government interfer-
ence in health care decisions. The focus on individual 
liberties as a limitation on governmental regulation, 
however, has proven a formidable obstacle to health 
reform efforts intended to promote solidarity. 
The fixture of individual liberty manifests as legal 
limits on Congress’s ability to require individuals to 
participate in commerce, including the purchase of 
health coverage. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress lacks the power under the 
Commerce Clause to enact the ACA’s individual man-
date, which required most people to purchase a mini-
mum level of insurance coverage or else pay a penalty,77 
concluding, “The individual mandate forces individu-
als into commerce precisely because they elected to 
refrain from commercial activity. Such a law cannot 
be sustained under a clause authorizing Congress to 
‘regulate Commerce.’”78 Although the Court upheld 
the individual mandate as a tax, Congress in 2017 
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effectively nullified the individual mandate by zeroing 
out the penalty.79 The saga over the ACA’s individual 
mandate illustrates the view that an individual’s right 
to be free from federal governmental coercion super-
sedes Congress’s authority to provide for comprehen-
sive health coverage through commercial regulation.
In a similar vein, the clash between individuals’ reli-
gious liberty and comprehensive health reform has 
generally been resolved in favor of the right to opt-out 
of health care obligations based on religious objec-
tions. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the notion of indi-
vidual religious liberty was extended to include the 
rights of closely held private corporations to opt-out 
of compliance with the ACA’s so-called contraceptive 
mandate,80 when covering contraception conflicted 
with the corporate owners’ religious beliefs.81 
Both NFIB and Hobby Lobby illustrate how an 
expansive notion of individual liberty, particularly in 
the commercial sphere, complicates and limits the 
regulatory mechanisms available to the federal gov-
ernment to achieve social solidarity in health care. 
Like vaccination’s herd immunity, efficient health care 
financing and optimal population health are under-
mined by fragmentation and improved through uni-
versality, so recognizing a strong right for natural 
or corporate persons to opt-out of components of a 
national health care system — whether for ideological, 
commercial, or religious reasons — limits the ability 
of the federal government to effectuate solidarity in 
health care.82
The flipside of individual liberty is an emphasis 
on personal responsibility that has driven a push for 
consumerism in health care. Giving individuals more 
“skin in the game,” so the theory goes, will make them 
more frugal consumers of health care and encourage 
them to make healthier choices.83 Doing so also per-
petuates anti-solidarity norms of actuarial fairness, 
even in government-financed health coverage that 
requires cost sharing. The ACA encouraged consum-
erism by continuing to fuel the rise of high-deduct-
ible health plans.84 A consumer approach, however, 
ignores the realities that patients are largely unable to 
act as consumers due to widespread market failures 
and non-shoppability of health care and that many 
illnesses or conditions are not manageable with life-
style changes.85 As a result, though insurance coverage 
increased under the ACA, a growing number of people 
are underinsured, driving a health care affordability 
crisis.86 Public opinion may be turning against con-
sumerism as a panacea to health system dysfunction, 
but the narrative of personal responsibility and a stub-
born faith in markets remain embedded in debates 
over how to distribute health care resources and con-
trol system costs. 
III. Navigating the Fixtures toward Social 
Solidarity, American Style 
The next steps in health reform, we argue, should shift 
focus from means (like “Medicare for All”) toward an 
embrace of social solidarity outcomes in health care 
as a shared goal. Social solidarity outcomes are those 
which result in the just distribution of the burdens 
and benefits associated with health according to a 
mutual aid principle.87 Some might assume that the 
“means” of universal coverage will automatically pro-
duce solidarity in outcomes. But the fixtures we have 
identified in the United States make universal cover-
age more difficult to achieve and therefore a neces-
sary but not sufficient tool for producing solidarity in 
outcomes. Any health reform proposal that aspires to 
put solidarity into practice must navigate, leverage, or 
overcome these four fixtures to be both feasible and 
durable. Doing so will produce a health system dis-
tinct from the comparator models established in other 
countries.88 In other words, pursuing health reform 
through the maze of these fixtures may produce social 
solidarity, American style.89 
Confronting a fixture prompts policy choices, which 
manifest as selection of design options: (1) relative 
degrees of control by state versus federal governments 
(federalism); (2) financing derived from federal, state, 
and private sources (fiscal pluralism); (3) role of pri-
vate entities (privatization); and (4) degree of choice 
in individual participation (individualism). Each set 
of choices presents trade-offs between individualism 
and social solidarity. 
The policy choices in current proposals for expand-
ing toward universal coverage confront the four fix-
tures to varying degrees and illustrate the influence of 
these four fixtures on American-style social solidarity 
in health care, as we explain in detail below. Figure 
1 summarizes the degree of confrontation with each 
of the four fixtures among federal-level proposals for 
single-payer or public-option reforms, as compared 
to the ACA. Figure 2 summarizes the degree of con-
frontation for similar reforms proposed to be imple-
mented at the state level. 
A. State or Federal Control
Any legislation seeking to establish universal health 
care will confront the fixture of American federalism 
in deciding what ratio of federal and state authori-
ties should administer it and what mix of regulatory 
baselines and regional variations to employ. A high 
degree of confrontation in federal legislative design 
relies heavily on federal authority and control, cedes 
little to state variation, and explicitly preempts or 
supplants existing spheres of state regulatory power. 
For this uniformity, a highly-confrontational design 
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trades away some of the accountability, adaptabil-
ity, and potential for experimentation from shared 
state-and-federal control. Reforms with a low degree 
of confrontation with the federalism fixture, by con-
trast, mitigate their expansions of federal authority 
with state implementation, expressly preserve exist-
ing state authority, and fund state variations on fed-
eral policy by encouraging them to negotiate statu-
tory waivers. For this cooperation and adaptability, a 
minimally-confrontational design trades away some 
of the solidarity-enhancing potential of national 
standards. 
The ACA’s incremental approach to the existing 
multi-payer system internalized federalism’s prevail-
ing narratives, largely demurring to the federalism 
fixture, even as it enacted some important nationwide 
reforms. The portions of the ACA that confronted fed-
eralism by establishing strong nationwide rules — like 
the availability of subsidies to purchase insurance and 
the requirement that commercial insurers offer poli-
Figure 1
Federal Health Reform Proposals’ Confrontation with Four Fixtures
Figure 2
State Health Reform Proposals’ Confrontation with Four Fixtures
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cies to anyone who can pay for it on the exchange — 
have had the greatest impact on overall population 
health and household cost-control. Those portions 
that invite state variation and negotiation, such as the 
Medicaid expansion (after NFIB v. Sebelius) and the 
waiver provision for “State Innovation,” have curtailed 
those gains in some states.90 
The national single-payer system contemplated in 
Medicare for All proposals confronts the federalism 
fixture directly in ways the ACA declined to do.91 Medi-
care for All would make federal finance and adminis-
tration the sole source of health care payment.92 This 
would subsume most, if not all, of the Medicaid pro-
gram and thereby eliminate a cooperative-federalism 
program in favor of a fully-federal one. “In addition to 
transferring fiscal responsibility” from state to federal 
control by shuttering Medicaid, “the [Medicare for 
All] proposals would shift the role of designing and 
implementing much of health policy from states to 
the federal government.”93 Further, Medicare for All 
extends federal financing authority and control over 
the entire commercial market for health insurance, 
still regulated in significant part by state authorities. 
By eliminating private insurance, Medicare for All 
proposals directly confront federalism by eliminating 
this longstanding area of state regulation and source 
of state-by-state variation.94 
Proposals that preserve the multi-payer system, but 
add an option to buy into a public program confront 
federalism to a lesser degree by retaining the heavily 
state-regulated private insurance, while potentially 
expanding the portion of the population covered by 
programs under federal control. The choice of which 
government program to expand — Medicare buy-in 
versus Medicaid buy-in — also has implications for 
the degree of federalism confrontation. Medicare buy-
in confronts federalism to a higher degree because 
it expands public participation in a program that is 
entirely under federal control. Medicaid buy-ins offer 
slightly more concession to state variability because 
they extend a program that already admits state-by-
state variation. Federal legislation could alter the 
baseline structure of the Medicaid program to make a 
buy-in a mandatory feature of Medicaid, though such 
a provision would have to contend with the anti-state 
coercion precedent from NFIB v. Sebelius.95 Med-
icaid buy-in proposals that would make a buy-in an 
optional feature for participating states96 additionally 
accede  to the federalism fixture and dilute the solidar-
ity-enhancing effects of a public option. 
To be feasible, universal reforms enacted at the state 
level — as illustrated in Figure 2 — must adapt to the 
strictures of federalism, rather than confronting them 
directly.97 Federal legislation may invite state partici-
pation through funding programs and by delegating 
implementation of other aspects of federal law. State 
legislation, however, generally has no mechanism to 
invite additional federal control except by incorporat-
ing existing federal standards. Similarly, states have 
few mechanisms to diminish federal control, except 
by complying with federal law. When state regula-
tion treads on spheres of federal authority or contra-
dicts duly-enacted federal law, preemption negates 
the state law.98 State-level proposals for single-payer 
systems or state Medicaid buy-ins thus tend to work 
within of existing federal programs, using existing fed-
eral waiver provisions to “repurpose” federal funding 
streams99 and seek federally-authorized variations.100
B. Federal, State, or Private Financing
A central question in designing a health care system 
is “who pays?” Potential payers include individuals 
and families, employers, providers, the community, 
states, or the federal government. For example, most 
Americans are today enrolled in employer-sponsored 
insurance that is paid in part by them and in part by 
their employers.101 Meanwhile, half of births and nurs-
ing home stays are paid for in part by the states and in 
part by the federal government through the Medicaid 
program.
The “who pays” question is incomplete without also 
asking “and for what?” Our system separates health 
care coverage costs by types of risk and divides risk-
bearing among entities. With high deductibles, indi-
viduals bear the risk for routine medical care. The risk 
of illness is divided between the insurance plan (which 
pays for most medical care, less cost sharing) and the 
sick individual and her family (who pay for cost shar-
ing, lost wages, and home care as needed), and provid-
ers (to the extent that they cannot collect on patients’ 
bad debt). The risk of catastrophic illness, meanwhile, 
can be carved off and borne by another entity like a 
state or federal government, as seen in the ACA’s rein-
surance program. 
And that is just the risks related to individual illness. 
A health care system must account for still more risks 
and, again, divides these risks among entities. The risk 
that the individuals who enroll in a particular insur-
ance plan will be unexpectedly unhealthy (known as 
adverse selection risk) is borne by default by whoever 
operates that plan (and so paid for by whoever pays 
for it). But this adverse selection risk can be carved 
off and borne by another entity; for example, the 
ACA’s risk corridors program put some such risk on 
the federal government.102 More broadly, the risk that 
an economic downturn will simultaneously increase 
demand for services and reduce revenue to pay for it 
by reducing individual incomes and the state and local 
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tax revenues they support (known as business cycle 
risk) drives the design of federal and state health care 
programs. 
The fixtures of American law generally favor this 
division of responsibility for health care costs, though 
they do not do so uniformly. Standing alone, the indi-
vidual rights and responsibility and privatization fix-
tures both tend to favor giving individuals full respon-
sibility for their health care costs rather than dividing 
such costs among individuals, employers, states, and 
the federal government. Professors Silver and Hyman 
endorse a proposal grounded in these two fixtures: 
give each resident a voucher reflecting federal and 
state health care subsidies, but then leave it to the indi-
vidual to bear full responsibility for how they choose 
to spend those subsidies and bear the costs associated 
with illness.103 By contrast, the federalism and plural-
ism fixtures favor the dispersal of responsibilities evi-
dent in our current financing system, which assigns 
costs as well to states, employers, and providers.
Potential reforms all confront the fixtures by con-
centrating financial responsibility for health care costs 
to greater degrees than the status quo, though some 
fragmentation remains under all existing proposals. 
The most unitary proposal, Representative Jayapal’s 
Medicare for All proposal, would concentrate respon-
sibility for all direct costs of medical care in the fed-
eral government.104 State contributions, employer 
contributions, and contributions by sick individuals 
through cost sharing would all be eliminated. Indeed, 
even provider responsibility for patient bad debt and 
costs incurred by the uninsured are eliminated, as the 
plan eliminates cost sharing and covers all residents, 
regardless of citizenship status or prior enrollment.105 
That said, the proposal’s confrontation with the fix-
tures is incomplete in two ways. First, Jayapal’s pro-
posal leaves sick residents and their families respon-
sible for lost wages and care work costs, in deference 
to the pluralism and individual rights and respon-
sibilities fixtures. Second, again in deference to fis-
cal pluralism, Jayapal’s proposal leaves fragmented 
responsibility for financing investments in the social 
determinants of health, concentrating only respon-
sibility for the downstream medical costs that result 
from a lack of such investment. 
Senator Sanders’ similar Medicare for All proposal 
accommodates the fixtures to a greater degree than 
Jayapal’s proposal in two ways. First, the Sanders pro-
posal retains a role for states in financing health care 
costs; certain existing state contributions are locked 
in place through a maintenance of effort provision.106 
Second, the Sanders proposal includes nominal cost 
sharing in the form of limited copays for certain 
services.107 
Where the financing structure for Medicare for All 
confronts fiscal pluralism, the structure for the Afford-
able Care Act largely accommodated it by adding to 
the complex division of responsibility for health care 
costs in the American health care system. The law left 
in place the underlying multi-payer system and cre-
ated in the exchanges a new financing mechanism 
paid for in part by individuals, administered in part 
by states, and operated largely through private insur-
ance markets. The ACA sought to finance the costs of 
insurance in the individual market in part by forcing 
healthy individuals into risk pools with less-healthy 
individuals, but the individual mandate that facili-
tated this broader risk pooling also brought the law in 
conflict with notions of individual liberty. 
The ACA’s framework also maintained numerous 
institutions that disperse responsibility for health 
care costs: reliance on employer sponsored insurance 
to cover a plurality of residents, division of federal 
and state responsibilities and liabilities, cost sharing 
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borne by sick individuals (and providers when bills 
go unpaid), and a significant uninsured population 
(including non-citizen residents) whose care costs 
would be borne by providers (and perhaps reimbursed 
by the federal government indirectly through dispro-
portionate share hospital payments). Current “public 
option” proposals would build on that framework, 
increasing the level of confrontation with the individ-
ual responsibility fixture somewhat by increasing the 
generosity of federal subsidies for premiums and cost 
sharing, without making any fundamental changes.108
C. Public versus Private Administration
Survey questions and political campaigns typically 
assume a stark distinction between “private insur-
ance” and “government administered health plans.109 
In reality, the line between the two is not always clear. 
What does “government administered” mean in a 
market where about one-third of Medicare enrollees 
and nearly 70% of Medicaid enrollees are covered by 
private health insurance plans? Proposals to provide 
public health insurance modeled on expanding Medi-
care or Medicaid to all must grapple with the role of 
private insurers, especially in light of how deeply 
embedded they are in our existing public programs.
The ACA took a highly deferential stance toward 
the dominance of private insurance. It expanded eli-
gibility for Medicaid, but specified that the newly-eli-
gible population must be covered by alternative ben-
efit plans, the vast majority of which are operated by 
private insurers. For people earning between one and 
four times the poverty line, the ACA offered subsidized 
private insurance, rather than public coverage. A pro-
posal to create a public option that would compete for 
enrollment against private plans on the exchanges was 
dropped from the ACA in a political compromise.110 
In contrast, some Medicare for All proponents con-
front privatization head-on by promising to elimi-
nate private insurance.111 But what does that mean 
in a system that currently relies on private insurance 
companies to administer public benefits? Would the 
traditional Medicare program continue to rely on pri-
vate insurance companies to administer local coverage 
determinations and process claims? Would the (cur-
rently privatized) Medicare drug benefit be converted 
to a publicly-administered plan? Would Medicare 
Advantage plans continue to be offered to enrollees as 
an alternative to traditional Medicare?
More moderate reformers propose to open access to 
public programs while preserving — or even expand-
ing — the role of privatized public coverage.112 These 
approaches would technically enroll everyone in a 
single program while allowing private insurance 
plans to thrive within that program. Reform mod-
eled on “Medicare Advantage for All” could allow any 
citizen or lawful permanent resident to enroll in the 
privatized Medicare plan of her choice. It could do so 
with or without giving enrollees the option of choos-
ing traditional Medicare. “Medicare Advantage Buy-
In” could allow privatized, government contracted 
Medicare plans to be offered on the health insurance 
exchanges alongside direct-purchase private insur-
ance. Private insurers would bid on contracts with 
the federal government to offer coverage in exchange 
for a combination of risk-rated, capitated payments 
by the government and premiums paid by enrollees. 
Similarly, proposals to open up privatized Medicaid 
coverage to all state residents (“Medicaid Managed 
Care for All”) or as an alternative to direct-purchase 
insurance on the state health insurance exchange 
(“Medicaid Managed Care Buy-In”) would be opera-
tionalized through a bidding process at the state level, 
followed by an open enrollment period in which resi-
dents choose from among multiple private plans and 
pay a premium to supplement state funding. Indeed, 
“public option” reforms scheduled to be implemented 
at the state level within the next two years direct state 
agencies to contract with private health insurers to 
offer privatized public coverage — not traditional 
Medicaid benefits — to buy-in enrollees.113 
Proposals to open access to privatized public cov-
erage to all or more Americans raise crucial ques-
tions. Foremost among them: what difference would 
it make? Does privatized public coverage offered pur-
suant to a government contract offer any advantages 
over directly-purchased private insurance with subsi-
dized premiums? Can privatized public coverage serve 
the goals adopted by single-payer and public-option 
proponents? Can it move us closer to social solidarity 
in American health care? Perhaps the most promising 
aspect of privatized public plans is that they could allow 
state agencies or CMS to use the contracting process 
to take a more hands-on role in shaping how health 
care providers are paid by private health plans. Wash-
ington state’s public option legislation, initially speci-
fied that the state-contracted plan would compensate 
providers at Medicare rates, which are considerably 
lower than payments offered by most direct-purchase 
and employer-based plans. State lawmakers eventu-
ally “watered down” the proposal by adopting a cap 
at 160% of Medicare rates, but that still represents a 
significant change from the status quo.114 Setting aside 
the potential cost savings, in terms of social solidarity, 
public debate over appropriate reimbursement rates 
brings us closer to collective problem-solving regard-
ing unsustainable health care price increases. But caps 
on the reimbursement rates government-contracted 
private health plans can pay to providers would be a 
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far cry from universal enrollment in a single, publicly 
administered, shared risk pool.
D. Degrees of Choice and Cost-Sharing
Health reforms must contend with the two sides 
of individualism — individual liberty and personal 
responsibility. The primary policy manifestations of 
this confrontation are the degrees of choice left to indi-
viduals to select their form of health coverage or opt-
out altogether and of cost-sharing for individuals to 
retain some personal skin-in-the game for their health 
care consumption. 
1. choice
American-style social solidarity health reforms con-
front the fixture of individual liberty in the form of 
optionality and choice. The design question is whether 
everyone is automatically enrolled in the government 
health plan (e.g., Medicare for All) or whether they 
have the option of enrolling in the government plan 
(e.g., Medicare for All Who Want It). 
The ACA contained both optional and universal 
components to its reforms. It preserved options for 
private coverage by providing a choice of regulated 
health plans on the exchanges. But the ACA took a uni-
versal approach for those eligible for Medicaid under 
the expansion. Non-immigrant adults between 19-64 
years of age with incomes below 138% of the federal 
poverty level have little choice but to enroll Medicaid 
or forego coverage,115 because private coverage options 
are unaffordable. 
There is a spectrum of choice in universal health 
reform design. At one end, everyone would be enrolled 
into a public plan covering standardized benefits and all 
providers. This universality is exemplified in Sanders’ 
Medicare for All plan and also resembles the traditional 
fee-for-service Medicare. All babies would be auto-
matically enrolled at birth, and everyone else would be 
transitioned from their current form of coverage over a 
period of time. This version reflects the greatest social 
and fiscal solidarity, with everyone in the country in one 
giant risk pool with the same benefits and coverage. To 
get around the Commerce Clause challenge the ACA’s 
individual mandate faced in NFIB v. Sebelius, Congress 
would have to rely on its power to tax and spend to 
establish such a program, similar to Medicare. 
At the other end of the choice spectrum, the public 
plan would be an option for anyone who wants to buy 
in, offered on the exchanges with more generous sub-
sidies than such plans today. This is the design of the 
public option proposals of moderate 2020 Democratic 
candidates, including the nominee, Joe Biden.116 Indi-
viduals with employer-based coverage could choose 
to enroll in the public plan or remain in their private 
employer plan, assuming their employer continues to 
offer it. Benefits would be standardized, so the pub-
lic plan would compete with private health plans 
on price through more aggressive rate controls. The 
extent of disruption to the private health insurance 
market would depend on myriad design decisions, 
such as how broad the provider network, how deep 
the provider rate controls, how easy to enroll, whether 
employers must pay for it even if they offer private 
coverage, and whether it would preserve the same tax-
advantage as current plans.117 Thus, a very compre-
hensive, broad-networked, cheaper plan, could form a 
glide path to single payer if it simply outcompetes pri-
vate plans on breadth and price, causing private pay-
ers to exit the market. On the other hand, a public plan 
that has a narrow network, is not much cheaper, and 
offer fewer tax advantages than private coverage may 
exist alongside private coverage and preserve a multi-
payer system indefinitely and do little to advance 
social solidarity.
On the dimension of choice, a middle-ground 
approach would resemble Medicare Advantage for All: 
a single universal government payer with regulated 
rates, offered through a choice of a variety of private 
plans to administer the benefits. Slight differences in 
benefits, provider networks, and premiums allow for 
differentiation and choice among competing plans. 
Even among proponents of universal health reform, 
debates persist about the importance of preserving 
choices among health coverage options. One of the 
main critiques of single-payer among those on the 
center-left has been that privately insured individuals 
would lose the choice of keeping their private health 
coverage.118 Proponents of single-payer respond that 
the choice people want is the choice of providers, not 
health plans, and provider choices could increase 
under single-payer.119 Nevertheless, the notion of 
health insurance choice as a way to preserve individ-
ual liberty may be overblown, because the multi-payer 
status quo provides little choice to most people, includ-
ing those for whom Medicaid is the only viable choice 
or individuals with an employer -selected health plan 
and a narrow provider network.120 
2. cost-sharing
For the related fixture of personal responsibility, health 
reforms must contend with how much individuals 
must pay for their health care in the form of premiums, 
cost-sharing, or penalties for failing to maintain cover-
age. As noted above, the ACA embraced consumerism, 
and the vast majority of exchange plans feature high 
deductibles.121 Public option reform proposals largely 
follow the ACA’s approach to cost-sharing, albeit with 
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more generous subsidies, constrained deductibles, 
and lower caps on out-of-pocket expenditures.122
In response to a growing unaffordability crisis in 
health care, single-payer advocates have proposed 
plans that impose no cost-sharing,123 and some plans 
(such as Medicare for All) even eliminate premiums.124 
The absence of patient cost-sharing or premiums are 
not a necessary feature of a single-payer plan. Other 
countries’ single-payer systems impose modest cost-
sharing or premiums, both to help pay for health 
care and to dampen overutilization driven by moral 
hazard, where individuals consume more third-party 
financed health care than they would if faced with 
the full costs.125 Even if one is skeptical of the degree 
of moral hazard and the potential of consumerism, a 
system that lacks any cost-sharing for higher income 
individuals would lead to a spike in demand for health 
care services, not all of it medically necessary. 
A middle-path would create a universal govern-
ment-financed health plan that imposes cost-sharing 
for those who can afford it. The current Medicare sys-
tem takes this approach, with significant cost-sharing 
for all but the poorest Medicare beneficiaries who are 
also eligible for Medicaid. Most non-dually-eligible 
Medicare beneficiaries finance their cost-sharing with 
private Medicare supplement plans. For budgetary 
reasons and to minimize moral hazard, an American-
style single-payer plan could impose some level of 
cost-sharing for all but the lowest-income Americans, 
and private supplemental insurance would fill the gap. 
Most other countries with public universal coverage 
systems have a robust role for private, supplemental 
insurance to finance cost-sharing and non-covered 
services.126
Social solidarity in health care does not require zero 
cost-sharing, but out-of-pocket costs should not be 
unaffordable to the point that people struggle to pay 
for necessary health care, go bankrupt, ration their 
medication, food, or shelter, or overly burden familial 
caregivers.127 Cost-sharing, if modest and affordable, 
can promote social solidarity by encouraging prudent 
consumption of health care, but a universal system 
should not rely on consumerism to control health care 
costs because health care is not a normal consumer 
good.
Conclusion
For next-step health reforms to move us toward 
greater social solidarity in health care, reformers must 
contend with four legal fixtures — federalism, plural-
ism, privatization, and individualism — that have sty-
mied the ACA and previous reform efforts. The path 
to universal health care in the United States is a wind-
ing one, as reforms must navigate the four fixtures 
with confrontations, accommodations, compromises, 
and tradeoffs. Compromise within one fixture might 
require an offsetting confrontation with another 
fixture to secure overall progress toward solidarity 
outcomes.128 
For example, if the politically feasible next step is 
a public option proposal, then reformers should con-
sider offsetting that compromise on fiscal pluralism 
with adjunct federalism reforms to confront the bar-
riers deterring states from going further in pursuing 
state single-payer systems.129 That offset might take 
the form of a federal statutory waiver to secure fund-
ing for state solidarity experiments, and a suspen-
sion of federal preemption for those experiments.130 
Similarly, if next-step reforms compromise on the 
privatization fixture, as in reliance on private admin-
istrators for public programs, then financing offsets 
for risk adjustment and reinsurance could advance 
solidarity in a privatized system by reducing incen-
tives for health status discrimination.131 Other provi-
sions that advance solidarity to offset compromises 
might include surprise billing regulation to mitigate 
the financial distress created by cost sharing,132 and 
upstream financial investments in public health and 
prevention to mitigate the disincentive for long-term 
investments created by pluralism and federalization.133
Focusing on outcomes reveals that the “universal 
coverage” goal of the ACA is necessary, but not suffi-
cient to realize social solidarity. The ACA, of course, 
did not achieve universal coverage with its segmented 
approach. But even if the ACA had secured a source 
of third-party funding for all Americans’ health care 
costs, their segmentation into different risk pools and 
dispersal among different payers and state systems 
undermines solidarity and permits inequitable distri-
bution within and between risk pools. The reality of 
compromise and tradeoff in navigating the four fix-
tures demands heightened vigilance to the ultimate 
outcomes of social solidarity. It also demands more 
ambitious goals which broadly encompass the just dis-
tribution of burdens and benefits in health care, not 
merely universal coverage or balancing cost, quality, 
and access to care. What emerges from this process is 
a distinctive version of social solidarity in health care, 
American-style. 
Successfully navigating these fixtures ultimately 
demands a broader framework for assessing the means 
and ends of American health reform efforts, beyond 
the traditional “iron triangle” focus on cost, quality, 
and access to medical care, “universal coverage,” or 
even the “triple aim” of improving patient experience 
and population health while reducing per capita cost 
within the health care system. Such broader metrics 
may include health justice and individual financial 
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and social well-being (broadly understood to include 
financial security and opportunity), to ensure reforms 
justly distribute the burdens and benefits of health 
care, as well as contend with the social, racial, eco-
nomic, or geographic health disparities that under-
mine solidarity. The moment for significant progress 
toward social solidarity in health care is upon us, and 
deft legal and policy navigation will maximize our 
ability to harness the moment.
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